Karnataka Police Issues Structured Guidelines for FIR Registration in Social Media Cases

The Karnataka Police has formalized a comprehensive framework through Circular No. L&O/MISC/06/2026 (Vol-II) to regulate the process of registering First Information Reports (FIRs) arising from social media content. This directive emerges in the backdrop of binding judicial pronouncements from the Supreme Court of India and the Karnataka High Court, and is aimed at curbing the mechanical exercise of police powers in matters involving online speech and expression.

Background and Judicial Context

The circular draws its authority from three significant judicial references:

  1. The Supreme Court's decision in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (Writ Petition Civil No. 943/2021 and connected matters)
  2. The Supreme Court's ruling in State of Telangana v. Nalla Balu @ Durgam Shashidhar Goud & Anr. (Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Dairy No. 71178/2025, dated 02.02.2026)
  3. The Karnataka High Court's order dated 29.08.2026 in Sri Mohan Gowda v. State of Karnataka and others (Writ Petition No. 25680/2026)

These rulings collectively reinforce the principle that while police authorities carry an obligation to respond to cognizable offences, this obligation must be discharged with legal rigor, proportionality, and respect for constitutionally guaranteed freedoms — particularly the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Supreme Court's Position on Hate Speech and FIR Mechanics

Findings in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India

The Supreme Court, in its final judgment in the above matter, articulated several foundational conclusions that now form the bedrock of this circular. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

"164. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, our conclusions are summarised as follows: –

  1. The creation of criminal offences and the prescription of punishments lie squarely within the legislative domain. The constitutional scheme, founded upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, does not permit the judiciary to create new offences or expand the contours of criminal liability through judicial directions.
  2. The precedents of this Court consistently affirm that while constitutional Courts may interpret the law and issue directions to secure the enforcement of fundamental rights, they cannot legislate or compel legislation. At the highest, the Court may draw attention to the need for reform; the decision whether, and in what manner, to legislate remains within the exclusive domain of the Parliament and the State Legislatures.
  3. The contention that the field of hate speech remains legislatively unoccupied is misconceived. The existing framework of substantive criminal law, including the provisions of the IPC and allied legislations, adequately addresses acts that promote enmity, outrage religious sentiments, or disturb public tranquillity. The field is, therefore, not unoccupied.
  4. The material placed before this Court indicates greater extent of the highlighted by the petitioners arise not from the absence of law, but from deficits in its consistent and effective enforcement. Such concerns, however significant, cannot justify the judicial assumption of legislative functions.
  5. The statutory framework under the CrPC (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), provides a comprehensive and layered mechanism to set the criminal law in motion. The duty of the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence is mandatory, as settled in Lalita Kumari (supra).
  6. In cases of non-registration of FIR, the CrPC/BNSS provide efficacious remedies. An aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) of CrPC or corresponding Section 173(4) of BNSS and thereafter invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC (corresponding Section 175 of BNSS) or proceed by way of a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC (corresponding Section 223 of BNSS). These remedies constitute a complete statutory architecture.
  7. The availability of such remedies, coupled with the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional Courts under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution demonstrates that no legislative vacuum exists warranting the intervention sought. The appropriate course lies in ensuring faithful and even-handed enforcement of existing law.
  8. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC or corresponding Section 175 of BNSS is of wide amplitude and includes supervisory oversight over the investigation at appropriate stages.