Karnataka HC Declares Section 24(2) of 2013 Act Inapplicable to KIAD Act Land Acquisitions

1. Background of the Appeal

In Ananthaswamy Vs State of Karnataka, Writ Appeal No.1451 of 2018 (LA – KIADB), the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court examined the validity of an order dated 25.04.2018 passed by a learned Single Judge in WP Nos.19348-349/2016 and 23686-696/2016. The appeal concerned land acquisitions undertaken for the Bangalore–Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP) under Section 28(1) and Section 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (KIAD Act).

The appellant sought to challenge both:

  • The preliminary and final notifications issued under the KIAD Act; and
  • The continuation of the acquisition in light of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act), contending that the proceedings had lapsed.

The Division Bench was required to address two central themes:

  1. Whether the challenge to the acquisition was barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata; and
  2. Whether Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act applies to acquisitions initiated under the KIAD Act, particularly in light of prior Supreme Court rulings.

2. Facts and Procedural History

2.1 Land Details and Project Context

The lands in question, situated in Hosakerehalli and Pantharpalya villages, had been earlier held by late Patel Chikkahanumaiah through inams abolition proceedings. A family settlement dated 26.12.1974 resulted in these properties falling to the share of the present appellant.

Subsequently, the State issued the following notifications under the KIAD Act for BMICP:

  • Preliminary notifications under Section 28(1) bearing No.CI 196 SPQ 98 dated 19.12.1998 and 29.01.2003; and
  • Final declarations under Section 28(4) bearing the same number dated 08.04.2003 and **05.07.2003`.

The appellant challenged these notifications in the writ petitions and additionally prayed for a declaration that the entire acquisition had lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

2.2 Earlier Litigation on the Same Acquisition

The respondents pointed out a detailed history of prior litigation over the same acquisition, involving the same appellant:

  • WP Nos.43358-59/2003:

    • Filed by the appellant challenging the same acquisition process.
    • Decided by order dated 18.12.2003.
    • The learned Single Judge quashed about 40% of the acquisition (relating to township, convention centre, etc.), while upholding 60% (relating to peripheral road, link road, service road and ramps).

  • Writ Appeal No.1558/2005:

    • Filed by the appellant against the order dated 18.12.2003.
    • Decided on 29.06.2005, following the judgment in WA No.72/2004 and connected matters disposed of on 28.02.2005.
    • A co-ordinate Bench ultimately upheld the entire acquisition.

  • Supreme Court proceedings:

    • The appellant approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.1562-1563/2006, later converted to C.A. No.2141/2006, clubbed with C.A. Nos.3492-94/2005 and other appeals.
    • By judgment dated 20.04.2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals and affirmed the judgment of the High Court in State of Karnataka and Another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 683.

Despite this litigation history, the appellant, in the later writ petitions, stated that no other writ petition concerning the subject matter had been filed, which the Division Bench treated as a direct suppression of material facts.

3. Appellant’s Contentions in the Present Appeal

The appellant advanced mainly the following arguments before the Division Bench:

  • The writ petition was disposed of without an effective hearing of his counsel, as counsel was absent on the day of disposal.
  • Certain factual submissions, legal contentions, and additional documents placed in the writ petitions were allegedly not considered by the learned Single Judge.
  • The acquisition for BMICP was argued to be illegal and carried out for the benefit of respondent No.4 (project proponent), who was stated to have commercially exploited the acquired lands by selling them or entering into Joint Development Agreements with third parties.
  • It was contended that in light of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the acquisition proceedings had lapsed, and hence the notifications under Section 28(1) and Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act should be quashed.

4. Respondents’ Defence

Counsel for the KIADB and respondent No.4, as well as the learned Additional Government Advocate, opposed the appeal on two principal grounds:

  1. Bar of res judicata and constructive res judicata:

    • The same acquisition had already been challenged up to the Supreme Court and upheld.
    • Fresh writ petitions seeking to re-open the acquisition were not maintainable.

  2. Suppression of material facts:

    • The appellant failed to disclose the prior writ proceedings and appeals, while expressly stating in the later writ petition that no earlier writ had been filed regarding the same subject matter.