Algorithmic Advertising, Trademarks and Safe Harbour: What Hindware vs Google Means for Digital Platforms

The Delhi High Court’s ruling in Hindware Ltd. v. Google LLC & Ors. CS(COMM) 591/2017, decided May 22, 2026 has fundamentally reframed how Indian law will view search advertising and keyword bidding in the years ahead. The judgment does far more than decide a single dispute about the Hindware mark. It recasts how courts interpret Section 29(6)(d) and Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and how that interacts with intermediary immunity under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000.

The court permanently restrained Google from using the Hindware trademark as a keyword and granted nominal damages of Rs. 30 lakhs. In doing so, it rejected long-standing arguments that algorithmic, backend keyword processes are invisible to consumers and thus fall outside the notion of “use” under trademark law.

This ruling, read with earlier decisions such as Google LLC v. DRS Logistic (P) Ltd. Delhi High Court, FAO(OS)(COMM) 2/2022 Dated: 10 August, 2023 and Christian Louboutin v. Nakul Bajaj, CS (COMM) 344/2018, I.As. 19124/2014, 20912/2014, 23749/2014, Date of decision :2nd November, 2018, and alongside the Calcutta High Court decision in Indiamart Inter Mesh Ltd. v. Open AI Inc., 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 5738, decided on 20-5-2026, signals a systemic shift in judicial thinking on digital platforms, algorithms and liability.

Decoding ‘Use in Advertising’ under Section 29(6)(d)

The Heart of the Dispute: What Counts as “Use”?

At the core of the Hindware–Google dispute lies Section 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which clarifies when a person is said to “use” a registered trademark. The provision specifies that use of a mark in advertising can amount to use for infringement purposes.

Google’s attempted defence was built on a restricted, visibility-focused understanding of this phrase. The platform argued that unless the trademark visibly appears in the advertisement shown to users, there is no actionable use, because the consumer never “sees” the mark in the sponsored link or ad text.

Under this viewpoint, the internal, algorithm-driven auction process—where brands bid on keywords, including rivals’ registered trademarks—was treated as a purely backend, technical function without legal significance.

The Court’s Linguistic and Functional Interpretation

The Delhi High Court rejected this narrow reading and adopted a more dynamic interpretation of Section 29(6)(d):

  • The term “advertising” (used in the statute) is not the same as “advertisement”.
  • “Advertising” is a continuous, active process – a gerund – and was treated by the court as a verb indicating conduct, not merely a static, visible output.

By focusing on legislative drafting choices, the court concluded that use “in advertising” includes:

  • Backend keyword bidding and auctions
  • Algorithmic matching of search queries with paid keywords
  • Code-driven targeting and suggestion mechanisms, such as keyword planner tools

In other words, the entire technical pipeline that takes an assessee’s registered mark, processes it, offers it as a bid term to competitors, and then displays competitive ads in response to that mark is part of “use in advertising” for infringement analysis.

Key Point: The legal concept of “use” now extends beyond what appears on the user’s screen to the underlying algorithmic machinery that monetizes the assessee’s trademark.

Liability Without Being a Direct Competitor

Another important dimension of the ruling is that Google and similar platforms (e.g., Meta) can be liable for trademark infringement even when:

  • They do not manufacture or sell the relevant products (such as sanitaryware), and
  • They do not themselves apply the trademark to any physical goods or services.

The judgment treats the platform as an active commercial participant in suggesting, auctioning and monetizing competing ads around the assessee’s mark, rather than a neutral conduit. This leads directly to questions of:

  • Unfair advantage
  • Free-riding on goodwill
  • Commercial morality

under Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Why the Grocery Store Analogy Failed

Google’s Brick-and-Mortar Comparison

Google attempted to analogize digital keyword bidding to a traditional, physical shop scenario. Suppose a consumer walks into a grocery store and asks for a particular brand—for re-illustration, imagine a customer asking for an “Oral-B” toothbrush.